Most modern systems strive to learn from interactions with users, and many engage in exploration: making potentially suboptimal choices for the sake of acquiring new information. We initiate a study of the interplay between exploration and competition-how such systems balance the exploration for learning and the competition for users. Here the users play three distinct roles: they are customers that generate revenue, they are sources of data for learning, and they are self-interested agents which choose among the competing systems.
We initiate a study of the interplay between exploration and competition. The main high-level question is: whether and to which extent competition incentivizes adoption of better exploration algorithms. This translates into a number of more concrete questions. While it is commonly assumed that better learning technology always helps, is this so for our setting? In other words, would a better learning algorithm result in higher utility for a principal? Would it be used in an equilibrium of the "competition game"? Also, does competition lead to better social welfare compared to a monopoly? We investigate these questions for several models, as we vary the capacity of users to make rational decisions and the severity of competition between the learning systems. (In our models, the two are coupled as they are controlled by the same "knob".)
The relationship between the severity of competition among firms and the quality of technology adopted as a result of this competition is a familiar theme in economics literature, known as "competition vs. innovation". We frame our contributions in terms of the "inverted-U relationship", a conventional wisdom regarding "competition vs. innovation" (see Figure 1 ).
Our model
We define a game in which two firms (principals) simultaneously engage in exploration and compete for users (agents). These two process are interlinked, as exploration decisions are experienced by users and informed by their feedback. We need to specify several conceptual pieces: how the principals and agents interact, what is the machine learning problem faced by each principal, and details of the game between the principals and the agents. Each piece can get extremely complicated in isolation, let alone jointly, so we strive for simplicity. Thus, the game is as follows:
• A new agent arrives in each round, and chooses among the two principals. The principal chooses an action (e.g., a list of web search results to show to the agent), the user experiences this action, and reports a reward.
• Each principal faces a very basic and well-studied version of the multi-armed bandit problem: for each arriving agent, it chooses from a fixed set of actions (a.k.a. arms) and receives a reward drawn independently from a fixed distribution specific to this action.
• What happens with a given agent is only observed by this agent and the principal chosen by this agent. Principals simultaneously announce their learning algorithms before the agents start arriving, and cannot change them afterwards. All agents share the same Bayesian prior on the rewards and the same "decision rule" for choosing among the principals.
Our model side-steps many potential complexities, including, resp.: (i) agents who arrive multiple times and may potentially learn over time and/or manipulate the principals' learning algorithms, (ii) numerous well-motivated generalizations of multi-armed bandits studied in machine learning, particularly ones that concern rewards that change over time. (iii) agents and principals secondguessing and gaming one another as the game progresses. In particular, each agent has welldefined beliefs about the agents that came before, and therefore is capable of making a decision, and each principal's "strategy" boils down to a multi-armed bandit algorithm (which is oblivious to the game-theoretic aspects of the model).
Our results
Our results depend crucially on agents' "decision rule" for choosing among the principals. The simplest and perhaps the most obvious rule is to select the principal which maximizes their expected utility; we refer to it as HardMax. We find that HardMax is not conducive to innovation. In fact, each principal's dominating strategy is to do no purposeful exploration whatsoever, and instead always choose an action that maximizes expected reward given the current information; we call this algorithm DynamicGreedy. While this algorithm may potentially try out different actions over time and acquire useful information, it is known to be dramatically bad in many important cases of multi-armed bandits -precisely because it does not explore on purpose, and may therefore fail to discover best/better actions. Further, we show that HardMax is very sensitive to tie-breaking when both principals have exactly the same expected utility according to agents' beliefs. If tie-breaking is probabilistically biased -say, principal 1 is always chosen with probability strictly larger than 1 2 -then this principal has a simple "winning strategy" no matter what the other principal does.
We relax HardMax to allow each principal to be chosen with some fixed baseline probability. One intuitive interpretation is that there are "random agents" who choose a principal uniformly at random, and each arriving agent is either HardMax or "random" with some fixed probability. We call this model HardMax&Random. We find that innovation helps in a big way: a sufficiently better algorithm is guaranteed to win all agents after an initial learning phase. While the precise notion of "sufficiently better algorithm" is rather subtle, we note that commonly known "smart" bandit algorithms typically defeat the commonly known "naive" ones, and the latter typically defeat DynamicGreedy. However, there is a substantial caveat: one can defeat any algorithm by interleaving it with DynamicGreedy (see Section 5 for details). This has two undesirable corollaries: a better algorithm may sometimes lose, and pure Nash equilibrium typically does not exist.
We further relax the decision rule so that the probability of choosing a given principal varies smoothly as a function of the difference between principals' expected rewards; we call it SoftMax. For this model, the "better algorithm wins" result holds under much weaker assumptions on what constitutes a better algorithm. This is the most technical result of the paper. The competition in this setting is necessarily much more relaxed: typically, both principals attract approximately half of the agents as time goes by (but a better algorithm may attract slightly more).
Economic implications. Our models differ in terms of rationality in agents' decision-making: from fully rational decisions with HardMax to relaxed rationality with HardMax&Random to an even more relaxed rationality with SoftMax. The decision rule also controls the severity of competition between the principals: from cut-throat competition with HardMax to a more relaxed competition with HardMax&Random to an even more relaxed competition with SoftMax. Further, uniform choice among principals corresponds to no rationality and no competition.
The results discussed above imply an inverted-U relationship between rationality/competition and innovation, in the spirit of Figure 1 , where innovation refers to the quality of multi-armed bandit algorithms selected in an equilibrium. Further, we find another, technically different inverted-U relationship, where we vary rationality/competition inside the HardMax&Random model, and we measure innovation via the marginal utility of switching to a better algorithm.
Remark. Much of the challenge in this paper, both conceptual and technical, was in setting up the theorems rather than proving them. Apart from making the modeling choices described in Section 1.1, it was crucial to interpret the results and intuitions from the literature on multi-armed bandits so as to formulate meaningful assumptions which are productive in our setting.
Map of the paper.
We survey related work (Section 2), lay out the model and preliminaries (Section 3), and proceed to analyze the three main models, HardMax, HardMax&Random and SoftMax (in Sections 4, 5, 6, resp.) . We discuss economic implications in Section 7. Appendix A provides some pertinent background on multi-armed bandits.
Related work
Exploration. Multi-armed bandits (MAB) is a particularly elegant and tractable abstraction for tradeoff between exploration and exploitation: essentially, between acquisition and usage of information. MAB problems have been studied in Economics, Operations Research and Computer Science for many decades, see (Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012; Gittins et al., 2011) for background on regret-minimizing and Bayesian formulations, respectively. A discussion of industrial applications of MAB can be found in Agarwal et al. (2016) .
The literature on MAB is vast and multi-threaded. The most related thread concerns regretminimizing MAB formulations with IID rewards (Lai and Robbins, 1985; Auer et al., 2002a) . This thread includes "smart" MAB algorithms that combine exploration and exploitation, such as UCB1 (Auer et al., 2002a) and Successive Elimination (Even-Dar et al., 2006) . Specific algorithms, and 'naive" MAB algorithms that separate exploration and exploitation, such as Explore-then-Exploit and ǫ-Greedy.
The three-way tradeoff between exploration, exploitation and incentives has been studied in several other settings: incentivizing exploration in a recommendation system (Che and Hörner, 2015; Frazier et al., 2014; Kremer et al., 2014; Mansour et al., 2015; Bimpikis et al., 2017; Bahar et al., 2016; Mansour et al., 2016) , dynamic auctions (e.g., Athey and Segal, 2013; Bergemann and Välimäki, 2010; Kakade et al., 2013) , pay-per-click ad auctions with unknown click probabilities (e.g., Babaioff et al., 2014; Devanur and Kakade, 2009; Babaioff et al., 2015) , coordinating search and matching by selfinterested agents (Kleinberg et al., 2016) , as well as human computation (e.g., Ho et al., 2014; Ghosh and Hummel, 2013; Singla and Krause, 2013) . Bolton and Harris (1999) ; Keller et al. (2005) ; Gummadi et al. (2012) studied models with selfinterested agents jointly performing exploration, with no principal to coordinate them.
There is a superficial similarity -in name only -between this paper and the line of work on "dueling bandits" (e.g., Yue et al., 2012; ). The latter is not about competing bandit algorithms, but rather about scenarios where in each round two arms are chosen to be presented to a user, and the algorithm only observes which arm has "won the duel".
Our setting is closely related to the "dueling algorithms" framework (Immorlica et al., 2011) which studies competition between two principals, each running an algorithm for the same problem. However, this work considers algorithms for offline / full input scenarios, whereas we focus on online machine learning and the explore-exploit-incentives tradeoff therein. Also, this work specifically assumes binary payoffs (i.e., win or lose) for the principals.
Other related work in economics. The competition vs. innovation relationship and the inverted-U shape thereof have been introduced (among many other ideas) in a classic book (Schumpeter, 1942) , and remained an important theme in the literature ever since (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005; Vives, 2008) . Production costs aside, this literature treats innovation as a priori beneficial for the firm. Our setting is very different, as innovation in exploration algorithms may potentially hurt the firm.
A line of work on platform competition, starting with Rysman (2009), concerns competition between firms (platforms) that improve as they attract more users (network effect); see Weyl and White (2014) for a recent survey. This literature is not concerned with innovation, and typically models network effects exogenously, whereas in our model network effects are endogenous (they are created by MAB algorithms, an essential part of the model).
Relaxed versions of rationality similar to ours are found in several notable lines of work. For example, "random agents" (a.k.a. noise traders) can side-step the "no-trade theorem" (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) , a famous impossibility result in financial economics. SoftMax model is closely related to the literature on product differentiation, starting from Hotelling (1929) , see Perloff and Salop (1985) for a notable later paper.
There is a large literature on non-existence of equilibria due to small deviations (which is related to the corresponding result for HardMax&Random), starting with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) in the context of health insurance markets. Notable recent papers (Veiga and Weyl, 2016; Azevedo and Gottlieb, 2017) emphasize the distinction between HardMax and versions of SoftMax.
While agents' rationality and severity of competition are usually modeled separately in the literature, it is not unusual to have them modeled with the same "knob" (e.g., Gabaix et al., 2016 ).
Basic model and preliminaries
Principals and agents. There are two principals and T agents. The game proceeds in rounds (we will sometimes refer to them as global rounds). In each round t ∈ [T ], the following interaction takes place. A new agent arrives and chooses one of the two principals. The principal chooses a recommendation: an action a t ∈ A, where A is a fixed set of actions (same for both principals and all rounds). The agent follows this recommendation, receives a reward r t ∈ [0, 1], and reports it back to the principal.
The rewards are i.i.d. with a common prior. More formally, for each action a ∈ A there is a parametric family ψ a (·) of reward distributions, parameterized by the mean reward µ a . (The paradigmatic case is 0-1 rewards with a given expectation.) The mean reward vector µ = (µ a : a ∈ A) is drawn from prior distribution P mean before round 1. Whenever a given action a ∈ A is chosen, the reward is drawn independently from distribution ψ a (µ a ). The prior P mean and the distributions (ψ a (·) : a ∈ A) constitute the (full) Bayesian prior on rewards, denoted P .
Each principal commits to a learning algorithm for making recommendations. This algorithm follows a protocol of multi-armed bandits (MAB). Namely, the algorithm proceeds in time-steps: 1 each time it is called, it outputs a chosen action a ∈ A and then inputs the reward for this action. The algorithm is called only in global rounds when the corresponding principal is chosen.
The information structure is as follows. The prior P is known to everyone. The mean rewards µ a are not revealed to anybody. Each agent knows both principals' algorithms, and the global round when (s)he arrives. Each principal is completely unaware of the rounds when the other is chosen.
Some terminology. The two principals are called "principal 1" and "principal 2". The algorithm of principal i ∈ {1, 2} is called "algorithm i" and denoted alg i . The agent in global round t is called "agent t"; the chosen principal is denoted i t .
Throughout, E[·] denotes expectation over all applicable randomness.
Bayesian-expected rewards. Consider the performance of a given algorithm alg i , i ∈ {1, 2}, when it is run in isolation (i.e., without competition, just as a bandit algorithm). Let rew i (n) denote its Bayesian-expected reward for the n-th step. Now, going back to our game, fix global round t and let n i (t) denote the number of global rounds before t in which this principal is chosen. Then:
Agents' response. Each agent t chooses principal i t as as follows: it chooses a distribution over the principals, and then draws independently from this distribution. Let p t be the probability of choosing principal 1 according to this distribution. Below we specify p t ; we need to be careful so as to avoid a circular definition.
Let I t be the information available to agent t before the round. Assume I t suffices to form posteriors for quantities n i (t), i ∈ {1, 2}, denote them by N i,t . Then for each principal i,
This quantity represents the posterior mean reward for principal i at round t, according to information I t ; hence the notation PMR. In general, probability p t is defined by the posterior mean rewards PMR i (t) for both principals. We assume a somewhat more specific shape:
(1)
Here f resp : [−1, 1] → [0, 1] is the response function, which is the same for all agents. We assume that the response function is known to all agents. To make the model well-defined, it remains to argue that information I t is indeed sufficient to form posteriors on n 1 (t) and n 2 (t). This can be easily seen using induction on t.
Since all agents arrive with identical information (other than knowing which global round they arrive in), it follows that all agents have identical posteriors for n i,t (for a given principal i and a given global round t). This posterior is denoted N i,t . Figure 2 : The three models for agents' response function: HardMax is thick blue, HardMax&Random is slim red, and SoftMax is the dashed curve.
Response functions. We use the response function f resp to characterize the amount of rationality and competitiveness in our model. We assume that f resp is monotonically non-decreasing, is larger than 1 2 on the interval (0, 1], and smaller than 1 2 on the interval [−1, 0). Beyond that, we consider three specific models, listed in the order of decreasing rationality and competitiveness (see Figure 2 ):
• HardMax: f resp equals 0 on the interval [−1, 0) and 1 on the interval (0, 1]. In words, agents choose the better principal with probability 1.
• HardMax&Random: f resp equals ǫ on the interval [−1, 0) and 1 − ǫ ′ on the interval (0, 1], where ǫ, ǫ ′ ∈ (0, 1 2 ) are some positive constants. In words, each agent is a HardMax agent with probability 1 − ǫ − ǫ ′ , and with the remaining probability she makes a random choice.
• SoftMax: f resp (·) lies in the interval [ǫ, 1 − ǫ], ǫ > 0, and is "smooth" around 0 (in the sense defined precisely in Section 6).
Unless specified otherwise, f resp is symmetric, in the sense that f resp (−x) + f resp (x) = 1 for any x ∈ [0, 1]. This implies fair tie-breaking: f resp (0) = 1 2 , and ǫ = ǫ ′ in the definitions above. MAB algorithms. We characterize the inherent quality of an MAB algorithm in terms of its Bayesian Instantaneous Regret (henceforth, BIR), a standard notion from machine learning:
where rew(n) is the Bayesian-expected reward of the algorithm for the n-th step, when the algorithm is run in isolation. We are primarily interested in how BIR scales with n; we treat K, the number of arms, as a constant unless specified otherwise. We will emphasize several specific algorithms or classes thereof:
• "smart" MAB algorithms that combine exploration and exploitation, such as UCB1 Auer et al. (2002a) and Successive Elimination Even- Dar et al. (2006) . These algorithms achieve BIR(n) ≤ O(n −1/2 ) for all priors and all (or all but a very few) steps n. This bound is known to be tight for any fixed n. 2
• "naive" MAB algorithms that separate exploration and exploitation, such as Explore-then-Exploit and ǫ-Greedy. These algorithms have dedicated rounds in which they explore by choosing an action uniformly at random. When these rounds are known in advance, the algorithm suffers constant BIR in such rounds. When the "exploration rounds" are instead randomly chosen by the algorithm, one can usually guarantee an inverse-polynomial upper bound BIR, but not as good as the one above: namely, BIR(n) ≤Õ(n −1/3 ). This is the best possible upper bound on BIR for the two algorithms mentioned above.
• DynamicGreedy: at each step, recommends the best action according to the current posterior: an action a with the highest posterior expected reward E[µ a | I ], where I is the information available to the algorithm so far. DynamicGreedy has (at least) a constant BIR for some reasonable priors, i.e., BIR(n) > Ω(1).
• StaticGreedy: always recommends the prior best action,i.e., an action a with the highest prior mean reward E µ∼P mean [µ a ]. This algorithm typically has constant BIR.
We focus on MAB algorithms such that BIR(n) is non-increasing; we call such algorithms monotone. While some reasonable MAB algorithms may occasionally violate monotonicity, they can usually be easily modified so that monotonicity violations either vanish altogether, or only occur at very specific rounds (so that agents are extremely unlikely to exploit them in practice).
More background and examples can be found in Appendix A. In particular, we prove that DynamicGreedy is monotone.
Competition game between principals. Some of our results explicitly study the game between the two principals. We model it as a simultaneous-move game: before the first agent arrives, each principal commits to an MAB algorithm. Thus, choosing a pure strategy in this game corresponds to choosing an MAB algorithm (and, implicitly, announcing this algorithm to the agents).
Principal's utility is primarily defined as the market share, i.e., the number of agents that chose this principal. Principals are risk-neutral, in the sense that they optimize their expected utility.
Assumptions on the prior. We make some technical assumptions for the sake of simplicity. First, each action a has a positive probability of being the best action according to the prior:
Second, posterior mean rewards of actions are pairwise distinct. That is, for any step and any feasible history h of an MAB algorithm at that step, 3 it holds that
In particular, prior mean rewards of actions are pairwise distinct:
for any a, a ′ ∈ A. This property is generic, e.g., it can be easily ensured by a small random perturbation of the prior.
Some more notation. Without loss of generality, we label actions as A = [K] and sort them according to their prior mean rewards, so that
Fix principal i ∈ {1, 2} and (local) step n. The arm chosen by algorithm alg i at this step is denoted a i,n , and the corresponding BIR is denoted BIR i (n). History of alg i up to this step is denoted H i,n .
Write PMR(a | E) = E[µ a | E] for posterior mean reward of action a given event E.
Generalizations
Our results can be extended compared to the basic model described above. First, unless specified otherwise, our results allow a more general notion of principal's utility that can depend on both the market share and agents' rewards. Namely, principal i collects U i (r t ) units of utility in each global round t when she is chosen (and 0 otherwise), where U i (·) is some fixed non-decreasing function with U i (0) > 0. In a formula,
Second, our results carry over, with little or no modification of the proofs, to much more general versions of MAB, as long as it satisfies the i.i.d. property. In each round, an algorithm can see a context before choosing an action (as in contextual bandits) and/or additional feedback other than the reward after the reward is chosen (as in, e.g., semi-bandits), as long as the contexts are drawn from a fixed distribution, and the (reward, feedback) pair is drawn from a fixed distribution that depends only on the context and the chosen action. The Bayesian prior P needs to be a more complicated object, to make sure that PMR and BIR are well-defined. Mean rewards may also have a known structure, such as Lipschitzness, convexity, or linearity; such structure can be incorporated via P . All these extensions have been studied extensively in the literature on MAB, and account for a substantial segment thereof; see Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012) for background and details.
Chernoff Bounds
We use an elementary concentration inequality known as Chernoff Bounds, in a formulation from Mitzenmacher an (2005) . 
Full rationality (HardMax)
In this section, we will consider the version in which the agents are fully rational, in the sense that their response function is HardMax. We show that principals are not incentivized to explorei.e., to deviate from DynamicGreedy. The core technical result is that if one principal adopts DynamicGreedy, then the other principal loses all agents as soon as he deviates.
To make this more precise, let us say that two MAB algorithms deviate at (local) step n if there is an action a ∈ A and a realization h of step-n history such that h is feasible for both algorithms, and under this history the two algorithms choose action a with different probability.
Theorem 4.1. Assume HardMax response function with fair tie-breaking. Assume that alg 1 is DynamicGreedy, and alg 2 deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from some (local) step n 0 < T . Then all agents in global rounds t ≥ n 0 select principal 1.
Corollary 4.2. The competition game between principals has a unique Nash equilibirium: both principals choose DynamicGreedy.
Remark 4.3. This corollary holds under a more general model which allows time-discounting: namely, the utility of each principal i in each global round t is U i,t (r t ) if this principal is chosen, and 0 otherwise, where U i,t (·) is an arbitrary non-decreasing function with U i,t (0) > 0.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
The proof starts with two auxiliary lemmas: that deviating from DynamicGreedy implies a strictly smaller Bayesian-expected reward, and that HardMax implies a "sudden-death" property: if one agent chooses principal 1 with certainty, then so do all subsequent agents do. We re-use these lemmas in Section 4.2.
Lemma 4.4. With algorithms as in Theorem 4.1 we have rew 1 (n 0 ) > rew 2 (n 0 ).
Proof. Since the two algorithms coincide on the first n 0 − 1 steps, it follows by symmetry that histories H 1,n 0 and H 2,n 0 have the same distribution. We use a coupling argument: w.l.o.g., we assume the two histories coincide, H 1,n 0 = H 2,n 0 = H.
At local step n 0 , DynamicGreedy chooses an action a 1,n 0 which maximizes the posterior mean reward given history H: for any realization h ∈ support(H) and any action a ∈ A
Since the two algorithms deviate at step n 0 , there is a realization h ∈ support(H) and an action a ∈ A such that Pr[a = a 2,n 0 a 1,n 0 | H = h] > 0. Inequality (6) is strict for this (h, a) pair by assumption (4). Integrating (6) over a ∼ (a 2,n 0 | H = h) and h ∼ H, we obtain rew 1 (n 0 ) > rew 2 (n 0 ). Here (a 2,n 0 | H = h) denotes the conditional distribution of a 2,n 0 given H = h.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose alg 1 is monotone, and PMR 1 (t 0 ) > PMR 2 (t 0 ) for some global round t 0 . Then PMR 1 (t) > PMR 2 (t) for all subsequent rounds t.
Proof. Formally, let's use induction on t, with the base case t = t 0 . Let N = N 1,t 0 be the agents' posterior distribution for n 1,t 0 , #global rounds before t 0 in which principal 1 is chosen. By induction, all agents from t 0 to t − 1 chose principal 1. Therefore,
where the first inequality holds because alg 1 is monotone, and the second is the base case.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Since the two algorithms coincide on the first n 0 − 1 steps, it follows by symmetry that rew 1 (n) = rew 2 (n) for any n < n 0 . By Lemma 4.4, rew 1 (n 0 ) > rew 2 (n 0 ). Recall that n i (t) is the number of global rounds s < t in which principal i is chosen, and N i,t is the agents' posterior distribution for this quantity. By symmetry, each agent t < n 0 chooses a principal uniformly at random. It follows that N 1,n 0 = N 2,n 0 (denote both distributions by N for brevity), and N (n 0 − 1) > 0. Therefore:
> N (n 0 − 1) · rew 2 (n 0 ) + n 0 −2 n=0 N (n) · rew 2 (n + 1) = E n∼N [rew 2 (n + 1)] = PMR 2 (n 0 )
So, agent n 0 chooses principal 1. By Lemma 4.5, all subsequent agents choose principal 1, too.
HardMax with biased tie-breaking
The HardMax model is very sensitive to the tie-breaking rule. For starters, if ties are broken deterministically in favor of principal 1, then principal 1 can get all agents no matter what the other principal does, simply by using StaticGreedy.
Theorem 4.6. Assume HardMax response function with f resp (0) = 1 (ties are always broken in favor of principal 1). If alg 1 is StaticGreedy, then all agents choose principal 1.
Proof. Agent 1 chooses principal 1 because of the tie-breaking rule, and the subsequent agents choose principal 1 by an induction argument similar to the one in the proof of Lemma 4.5.
A more challenging scenario is when the tie-breaking is biased in favor of principal 1, but not deterministically so: f resp (0) > 1 2 . Then this principal also has a "winning strategy" no matter what the other principal does. Specifically, principal 1 can get all but the first few agents, under a mild technical assumption that DynamicGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy. Principal 1 can use DynamicGreedy, or any other monotone MAB algorithm that coincides with DynamicGreedy in the first few steps.
Theorem 4.7. Assume HardMax response function with f resp (0) > 1 2 (i.e., tie-breaking is biased in favor of principal 1). Assume the prior P is such that DynamicGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy starting from some step n 0 . Suppose that principal 1 runs a monotone MAB algorithm that coincides with DynamicGreedy in the first n 0 steps. Then all agents t ≥ n 0 choose principal 1.
Proof. The proof re-uses Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5, which do not rely on fair tie-breaking.
Because of the biased tie-breaking, for each global round t we have
Recall that i t is the principal chosen in global round t. Let m 0 be the first round when alg 2 deviates from DynamicGreedy, or DynamicGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy, whichever comes sooner. Note that rew 1 (n) = rew 2 (n) for each step n < m 0 , by definition of m 0 , and rew 1 (n) ≥ rew 2 (n) by Lemma 4.4. To summarize:
rew 1 (n) ≥ rew 2 (n) for all steps n ≤ m 0 .
We claim that Pr[i t = 1] > 1 2 for all global rounds t ≤ m 0 . We prove this claim using induction on t. The base case t = 1 holds by (8) and the fact that in step 1, DynamicGreedy chooses the arm with the highest prior mean reward. For the induction step, we assume that Pr[i t = 1] > 1 2 for all global rounds t < t 0 , for some t 0 ≤ m 0 . It follows that distribution N 1,t 0 stochastically dominates distribution N 2,t 0 . 4 Observe that
[rew 2 (n + 1)] = PMR 2 (t 0 ).
So the induction step follows by (8). Claim proved. Now let us focus on global round m 0 , and denote N i = N i,m 0 . By the above claim, N 1 stochastically dominates N 2 , and moreover N i (m 0 − 1) > N i (m 0 − 1).
By definition of m 0 , either (i) alg 2 deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from local step m 0 , which implies rew 1 (m 0 ) > rew 2 (m 0 ) by Lemma 4.4, or (ii) DynamicGreedy deviates from StaticGreedy starting from local step m 0 , which implies rew 1 (m 0 ) > rew 1 (m 0 − 1) by Lemma A.4. In both cases, using (9) and (11), it follows that the inequality in (10) is strict for t 0 = m 0 .
Therefore, agent m 0 chooses principal 1, and by Lemma 4.5 so do all subsequent agents.
Relaxed rationality: HardMax & Random
This section is dedicated to the HardMax&Random response model, where each principal is always chosen with some positive baseline probability. The main technical result for this model states that a principal with asymptotically better BIR wins by a large margin: after a "learning phase" of constant duration, all agents choose this principal with maximal possible probability f resp (1). For example, a principal with BIR(n) ≤Õ(n −1/2 ) wins over a principal with BIR(n) ≥ Ω(n −1/3 ). However, this positive result comes with a significant caveat detailed in Section 5.1. We formulate and prove a cleaner version of the result, followed by a more general formulation developed in a subsequent Remark 5.2. We need to express a property that alg 1 eventually catches up and surpasses alg 2 , even if initially it receives only a fraction of traffic. For the cleaner version, we assume that both algorithms are well-defined for an infinite time horizon, so that their BIR does not depend on the time horizon T of the game. Then this property can be formalized as:
In fact, a weaker version of (12) suffices: denoting ǫ 0 = 1 2 f resp (−1), for some constant n 0 we have (∀n ≥ n 0 ) BIR 1 (ǫ 0 n)/BIR 2 (n) < 1 2 .
We also need a very mild technical assumption on the "bad" algorithm:
(∀n ≥ n 0 ) BIR 2 (n) > 2 e −ǫ 0 n/6 .
Theorem 5.1. Assume HardMax&Random response function. Suppose both algorithms are well-defined for an infinite time horizon, and satisfy (13) and (14). Then each agent t ≥ n 0 chooses principal 1 with maximal possible probability f resp (1).
Proof. Consider global round t ≥ n 0 . Recall that each agent chooses principal 1 with probability at least f resp (−1) > 0, and denote ǫ 0 = f resp (−1)/2. Then E[n 1 (t + 1)] ≥ 2ǫ 0 t. By Chernoff Bounds (Theorem 3.1), we have that n 1 (t + 1) ≥ ǫ 0 t holds with probability at least 1 − q, where q = exp(−ǫ 0 t/6).
We need to prove that PMR 1 (t) − PMR 2 (t) > 0. For any m 1 and m 2 , consider the quantity ∆(m 1 , m 2 ) := BIR 2 (m 2 + 1) − BIR 1 (m 1 + 1).
Whenever m 1 ≥ ǫ 0 t − 1 and m 2 < t, it holds that
The above inequalities follow, resp., from algorithms' monotonicity and (13). Now, (14)).
Remark 5.2. Many standard MAB algorithms in the literature are parameterized by the time horizon T . Regret bounds for such algorithms usually include a polylogarithmic dependence on T . In particular, a typical upper bound for BIR has the following form:
Here we write BIR(n | T ) to emphasize the dependence on T . We generalize (13) to handle the dependence on T : for some n 0 = n 0 (T ) ∈ polylog(T ),
In this holds, we say that alg 1 BIR-dominates alg 2 . We prove a version of Theorem 5.1 in which algorithms are parameterized with time horizon T and condition (13) is replaced with (16); its proof is very similar and is omitted.
To state a game-theoretic corollary of Theorem 5.1, we consider a version of the competition game between the two principals in which they can only choose from a finite set A of monotone MAB algorithms. One of these algorithms is "better" than all others; we call it the special algorithm. Unless specified otherwise, it BIR-dominates all other allowed algorithms. The other algorithms satisfy (14). We call this game the restricted competition game.
Corollary 5.3. Assume HardMax&Random response function. Consider the restricted competition game with special algorithm alg. Then, for any sufficiently large time horizon T , this game has a unique Nash equilibrium: both principals choose alg.
A little greedy goes a long way
Given any monotone MAB algorithm other than DynamicGreedy, we design a modified algorithm which learns at a slower rate, yet "wins the game" in the sense of Theorem 5.1. As a corollary, the competition game with unrestricted choice of algorithms typically does not have a Nash equilibrium.
Given an algorithm alg 1 that deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from step n 0 and a "mixing" parameter p, we will construct a modified algorithm as follows.
1. The modified algorithm coincides with alg 1 (and DynamicGreedy) for the first n 0 − 1 steps; 2. In each step n ≥ n 0 , alg 1 is invoked with probability 1−p, and with the remaining probability p one does the "greedy choice": chooses an action with the largest posterior mean reward given the current information collected by alg 1 .
For a cleaner comparison between the two algorithms, the modified algorithm does not record rewards received in steps with the "greedy choice". Parameter p > 0 is the same for all steps.
Theorem 5.4. Assume symmetric HardMax&Random response function. Let ǫ 0 = f resp (±1) be the baseline probability. Suppose alg 1 deviates from DynamicGreedy starting from some step n 0 . Let alg 2 be the modified algorithm, as described above, with mixing parameter p such that (1 − ǫ 0 )(1 − p) > ǫ 0 . Then each agent t ≥ n 0 chooses principal 2 with maximal possible probability 1 − ǫ 0 .
Corollary 5.5. Suppose that both principals can choose any monotone MAB algorithm, and assume the symmetric HardMax&Random response function. Then for any time horizon T , the only possible pure Nash equilibrium is one when both principals choose DynamicGreedy. Moreover, no pure Nash equilibrium exists when some algorithm "dominates" DynamicGreedy in the sense of (16) and the time horizon T is sufficiently large.
Remark 5.6. The modified algorithm performs exploration at a slower rate. Let us argue how this may translate into a larger BIR compared to the original algorithm. Let BIR ′ 1 (n) be the BIR of the "greedy choice" after after n − 1 steps of alg 1 . Then
In particular, suppose BIR 1 (n) ∼ n −γ and BIR ′ 1 (n) ≥ c BIR 1 (n), for some constants γ ∈ (0, 1) and c > 1 − γ . Then using Jensen's inequality, for all n ≥ n 0 and small enough p > 0 it holds that
(The last inequality follows by plugging in BIR 1 (n) ∼ n −γ and using the fact that (1 − p) γ < 1 − pγ .) Proof of Theorem 5.4. Let rew ′ 1 (n) denote the Bayesian-expected reward of the "greedy choice" after after n − 1 steps of alg 1 . Note that rew 1 (·) and rew ′ 1 (·) are non-decreasing: the former because alg 1 is monotone and the latter because the "greedy choice" is optimized given an increasing set of observations. Therefore, the modified algorithm alg 2 is monotone by (17).
By definition of the "greedy choice", rew 1 (n) ≥ rew ′ 1 (n) for all steps n, . Moreover, by Lemma 4.4, alg 1 has a strictly larger rew(n 0 ) compared to DynamicGreedy; so, rew 1 (n 0 ) > rew 2 (n 0 ).
Let alg denote a copy of alg 1 that is running "inside" the modified algorithm alg 2 . Let m 2 (t) be the number of global rounds before t in which the agent chooses principal 2 and alg is invoked; in other words, it is the number of agents seen by alg before global round t. Let M 2,t be the agents' posterior distribution for m 2 (t).
We claim that in each global round t ≥ n 0 , distribution M 2,t stochastically dominates distribution N 1,t , and PMR 1 (t) < PMR 2 (t). We use induction on t. The base case t = n 0 holds because M 2,t = N 1,t (because the two algorithms coincide on the first n 0 − 1 steps), and PMR 1 (n 0 ) < PMR 2 (n 0 ) is proved as in (7), using the fact that rew 1 (n 0 ) < rew 2 (n 0 ).
The induction step is proved as follows. The induction hypothesis for global round t−1 implies that agent t − 1 is seen by alg with probability (1 − ǫ 0 )(1 − p), which is strictly larger than ǫ 0 , the probability with which this agent is seen by alg 2 . Therefore, M 2,t stochastically dominates N 1,t .
= PMR 2 (t).
Here inequality (18) holds because rew 1 (·) is monotone and M 2,t stochastically dominates N 1,t , and inequality (19) holds because rew 1 (n 0 ) < rew 2 (n 0 ) and M 2,t (n 0 ) > 0. 5
SoftMax response function
This section is devoted to the SoftMax model. We recover a positive result under the assumptions from Theorem 5.1 (albeit with a weaker conclusion), and then proceed to a much more challenging result under weaker assumptions. We start with a formal definition:
Definition 6.1. A response function f resp is SoftMax if the following conditions hold:
• f resp (·) is bounded away from 0 and 1: f resp (·) ∈ [ǫ, 1 − ǫ] for some ǫ ∈ (0, 1 2 ), • the response function f resp (·) is "smooth" around 0:
• fair tie-breaking: f resp (0) = 1 2 . Our first result is a version of Theorem 5.1, with the same assumptions about the algorithms and essentially the same proof. The conclusion is much weaker: we can only guarantee that each agent t ≥ n 0 chooses principal 1 with probability slightly larger than 1 2 . This is essentially unavoidable in a typical case when both algorithms satisfy BIR(n) → 0, by Definition 6.1. Theorem 6.2. Assume SoftMax response function. Suppose alg 1 has better BIR in the sense of (16), and alg 2 satisfies technical condition (14) . Then each agent t ≥ n 0 chooses principal 1 with probability
Proof Sketch. We follow the steps in the proof of Theorem 5.1 to derive
This is at least BIR 2 (t)/4 by (14). Then (21) follows by the smoothness condition (20).
We recover a version of Corollary 5.3, if principal's utility is the number of users (rather than the more general model in (5)). We also need a mild technical assumption that cumulative Bayesian regret (BReg) tends to infinity. BReg is a standard notion from the literature (along with BIR):
Corollary 6.3. Assume that response function is SoftMax, and principal's utility is the number of users. Consider the restricted competition game with special algorithm alg, and assume that all other allowed algorithms satisfy BReg(n) → ∞. Then, for any sufficiently large time horizon T , this game has a unique Nash equilibrium: both principals choose alg.
Further, we prove a much more challenging result in which the "BIR-dominance" (16) is replaced with a much weaker condition: for some n 0 (T ) ∈ polylog(T ) and constants β 0 , α 0 ∈ (0, 1/2),
In this holds, we say that alg 1 weakly BIR-dominates alg 2 . Note that while the BIR-dominance condition (16) involves sufficiently small multiplicative factors (resp., ǫ 0 and 1 2 ), the new condition replaces them with factors that can be arbitrarily close to 1.
We need a slightly stronger version of the technical assumption (14): for any ǫ > 0, there exists n(ǫ) such that for
Theorem 6.4. Assume SoftMax response function. Suppose alg 1 weakly-BIR-dominates alg 2 , and the latter satisfies (24) . Then there exists some T such that each agent t ≥ T ′ chooses principal 1 with probability
The main idea behind our proof is that even though alg 1 may have a slower rate of learning in the beginning, it will gradually catch up and surpass alg 2 . We will describe this process in two phases. In the first phase, alg 1 receives a random agent with probability at least f resp (−1) > 0 in each round. Although this is may be a slow rate, the difference in BIR between the two algorithms is gradually diminishing. After a sufficiently long time, alg 1 attracts each agent with probability at least 1/2 − O(β 0 ). Then the game enters the second phase: both algorithms receive agents at a rate close to 1 2 , and the fractions of agents received by both algorithms -n 1 (t)/t and n 2 (t)/talso converge to 1 2 . In the end of the second phase, and in each global round afterwards, the agent counts n 1 (t) and n 2 (t) fit into the weak-BIR-dominance condition, in the sense that both are larger than n 0 (T ), and n 1 (t) ≥ (1 − β 0 ) n 2 (t). So now alg 1 actually provides better rewards, which gets reflected in the PMR's eventually. Accordingly, from then on alg 1 attracts agents at the rate slightly larger than 1 2 . We prove that the "bump" over the 1 2 is at least on the order of BIR 2 (t).
Proof of Theorem 6.4. Let ǫ 0 = f resp (−1) 2 , and so each agent chooses alg 1 with probability at least 2ǫ 0 . Let β 1 = min{c ′ 0 δ 0 , β 0 /20} with δ 0 defined in (20). First, we will show that for any β 1 ∈ (0, 1), there exists some sufficiently large T 1 such that BIR 1 (ǫ 0 T 1 ) ≤ β 1 /c ′ 0 . For any t ≥ T 1 , we know E[n 1 (t + 1)] ≥ 2ǫ 0 t, and by Chernoff Bounds (Theorem 3.1), we have n 1 (t + 1) ≥ ǫ 0 t holds with probability at least 1 − q 1 (t) with q 1 (t) = exp(ǫ 0 t/6). It follows that for any t ≥ T 1 ,
where the second inequality follows from (14). Since the response function f resp is c ′ 0 -Lipschitz in the neighborhood of [−δ 0 , δ 0 ], each agent after round T 1 will choose alg 1 with probability at least
Next, we will show that there exists a sufficiently large T 2 such that for any t ≥ T 1 + T 2 , we can guarantee that with high probability, n 1 (t) > max{n 0 , (1 − β 0 )n 2 (t)}, where n 0 is defined in (23). Let us first lower bound the number agents received by alg 1 after some number of rounds t = T 1 + T ′ for any T ′ ≥ T 1 . Since each agent chooses alg 1 with probability at least 1/2 − β 1 , by Chernoff Bounds (Theorem 3.1) we have with probability at least 1 − q 2 (t) that the number of agents that choose alg 1 is at least (1/2−β 1 )T ′ −A, where A = β 1 T ′ /8 and function q 2 (x) = e −c x for some constant c. Note that the number of agents received by alg 2 is at most T 1 + (1 + β 1 )T ′ /2 + A.
Then as long as we have T 2 ≥ max{ 3T 1 (1−β 0 ) , 8n 0 }, we can guarantee that for any t ≥ T 1 + T 2 , n 1 (t) > n 2 (t)(1 − β 0 ) and n 1 (t) > n 0 with probability at least 1 − q 2 (t).
Finally, we will argue that in each round t ≥ T 1 + T 2 , we can guarantee that
Note that the weak BIR-dominance condition in (23) implies that for any t ≥ T 1 + T 2 with probability at least 1 − q 2 (t), BIR 1 (n 1 (t)) < (1 − α 0 )BIR 2 (n 2 (t)).
It follows that for any t ≥ T 1 + T 2 ,
[BIR 2 (m 2 + 1) − BIR 1 (m 1 + 1)]
where the last inequality holds as long as q 2 ≤ α 0 BIR 2 (t)/4, and is implied by the condition in (24) as long as T 2 is sufficiently large. Hence, by the definition of our SoftMax response function and assumption in (20), we have
Corollary 6.5. Assume that response function is SoftMax, and principal's utility is the number of users. Consider the restricted competition game in which the special algorithm alg weakly-BIR-dominates the other allowed algorithms, and the latter satisfy BReg(n) → ∞. Then, for any sufficiently large time horizon T , there is a unique Nash equilibrium: both principals choose alg.
Economic implications
We frame our contributions in terms of the relationship between competition and innovation, i.e., between the extent to which the game between the two principals is competitive, and the degree of innovation that these models incentivize. Competition is controlled via the response function f resp , and innovation refers to the quality of the technology (MAB algorithms) adopted
Competition/Rationality
Innovation/alg in equilibrium Uniform SoftMax HardMax&Random HardMax Figure 3 : The stylized inverted-U relationship in the "main story" by the principals. The competition vs. innovation relationship is well-studied in the economics literature, and is commonly known to often follow an inverted-U shape, as in Figure 1 (see Section 2 for citations). Competition in our models is closely correlated with rationality: the extent to which agents make rational decisions, and indeed rationality is what f resp controls directly.
Main story. Our main story concerns the restricted competition game between the two principals where one allowed algorithm alg is "better" than the others. We measure innovation in terms of whether and when alg is chosen in an equilibrium. We vary competition/rationality by changing the response function from HardMax (full rationality, very competitive environment) to HardMax&Random to SoftMax (less rationality and competition). We find a competition/rationality vs. innovation relationship which goes as follows:
HardMax: no innovation: DynamicGreedy is chosen over alg.
HardMax&Random: some innovation: alg is chosen as long as it BIR-dominates.
SoftMax: more innovation: alg is chosen as long as it weakly- This follows, resp., from Corollaries 4.2, 5.3 and 6.3. We can complete these three bullets to an inverted-U relationship if we include the uniform choice between the principals, which corresponds to the least amount of rationality. When principals' utility is the number of agents, uniform choice provides no incentives to innovate. 7 See Figure 3 for a stylized depiction of the inverted-U relationship.
Secondary story. Let us zoom in on the symmetric HardMax&Random model. Competition/rationality within this model is controlled by the baseline probability ǫ 0 = f resp (±1), which goes smoothly between the two extremes of HardMax and the uniform choice (resp., ǫ 0 = 0 and ǫ 0 = 1 2 ). For clarity, we assume that principal's utility is the number of agents. We consider the marginal utility of switching to a better algorithm. Suppose initially both principals use some algorithm alg, and principal 1 ponders switching to another algorithm alg' which BIR-dominates alg. We are interested in the corresponding increase in utility; we refer to this increase as incentive-to-innovate (i2i), and we use it to quantify innovation.
We find the following competition/rationality vs. innovation relationship:
• ǫ 0 = 0 (HardMax): i2i can be negative if alg is DynamicGreedy.
• ǫ 0 near 0: only a small i2i can be guaranteed, as it may take a long time for alg ′ to "catch up" with alg, and hence less time to reap the benefits.
• "medium-range" ǫ 0 : large i2i, as alg ′ learns fast and gets most agents.
• ǫ 0 near 1 2 : small i2i, as principal 1 gets most agents for free no matter what.
The familiar inverted-U shape is depicted in Figure 4 .
Remark A.3. A similar result holds for rewards which are distributed as Bernoulli random variables. In this case we consider accumulative reward of an action as a random walk, and use a high probability variation of the law of iterated logarithms. (Details omitted.)
Next, we show that DynamicGreedy is monotone.
Lemma A.9. Assume that if µ i ≥ µ j then the rewards r i stochastically dominates the rewards r j . Then, SuccesiveEliminationReset is monotone Proof. Consider the first time T an action is eliminated, and let T = τ be a realized value of T . Then, clearly for n < τ we have rew(n) = rew(1) . Consider two actions a 1 , a 2 ∈ A, such that µ a 1 ≥ µ a 2 . At time T = τ, the probability that a 1 is eliminated is smaller than the probability that a 2 is eliminated. This follows sinceμ a 1 stochastically dominatesμ a 2 , which implies that for any threshold θ we have Pr[μ a 1 ≥ θ] ≥ Pr[μ a 2 ≥ θ].
After the elimination we consider the expected reward of the eliminated action i∈A µ i q i , where q i is the probability that action i was eliminated in time T = τ. We have that q i ≤ q i+1 , from the probabilities of elimination.
The sum i∈A µ i q i with q i ≤ q i+1 and i q i = 1 is maximized by setting q i = 1/|A|. ( We can see that if there are q i 1/|A|, then there are two q i < q i+1 , and one can see that setting both to (q i + q i+1 )/2 increases the value.) Therefore we have that the rew(τ) ≥ rew(τ − 1). Now we can continue by induction. For the induction, we can show the property for any remaining set of at most k−1 actions. The main issue is that SuccesiveEliminationReset restarts from scratch, so we can use induction.
